We discuss the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states in connection with the quantum cryptography. We show that checking a ratio of null one to signal is essential in detecting a certain kind of eavesdropping in the case of two nonorthogonal states quantum cryptography. We prove that it is not needed in the case of the four states quantum cryptography.
1
One of the most intriguing and exciting recent developments in quantum mechanics has been the prediction and demonstration of a cryptographic key distribution scheme, the security of which is guaranteed by the laws of physics, or, rather, the laws of quantum mechanics [1] . Theoretical models for quantum key distributions has been proposed based on the uncertainty principle [2] , EPR states [3] , two nonorthogonal states [4] and Wheeler's delayed choice experiment [5] .
The security of quantum cryptography relies on the fact that we cannot distinguish, with certainty, several quantum nonorthogonal states ( with 100% efficiency ). That is, if we can distinguish the several quantum nonorthogonal states used as the information carriers in quantum cryptography, then we can successfully eavesdrop it. However, there is one exception in the indistinguishability: in the case of two nonorthogonal states, we can distinguish between them with certainty, albeit with an efficiency η < 1 [7] - [9] ( the unambiguous quantum measurement ). What we will consider in connection with the quantum cryptography is a simple example of the unambiguous quantum measurement: suppose that we are given spin- 1 2 particles in one of two nonorthogonal states, for example, |z+ or |x+ , where |z± ( |x± ) is an eigenstate with the eigenvalue ±h 2 of the spin-measurement along z ( x ) directionŜ z (Ŝ x ). We performŜ z orŜ x at random on each particle. When we get the outcome |z− ( |x− ), we can know, with certainty, that the measured particle was not in the |z+ ( |x+ ) state, that is, the measured particle was in the |x+ ( |z+ ) state ( the conclusive result ). When we get the outcome |z+ or |x+ , on the other hand, we do not know whether the measured particle was in |z+ or |x+ state ( the inconclusive result ). In Ref. [7] - [9] , they consider more optimal ones where the efficiency ( the probability of obtaining the conclusive result ) is higher than that (
) of this example. What we discuss in this note applies also to the more optimal ones.
Although the same thing can be said for the quantum cryptography using four nonorthogonal states [2] ( hereafter the four states one ), we briefly describe only that using two nonorthogonal states [4, 6] ( hereafter the two states one ): (1) Alice send to Bob a random binary sequence encoded on quantum carriers using two nonorthogonal states |0 and |1 to denote bits 0 and 1, respectively. Since any two nonorthogonal states work, we may adopt here |z+ and |x+ as |0 eavesdropping by revealing to each other in public some randomly chosen subsequence of bits which they subsequently discard. If there had been eavesdropping, the eavesdropper is bound to introduce some errors in the perfect correlation in (4) . If the test is negative, the distribution must be set up again, if the test is positive the remaining unrevealed bits form the key. Since a similar eavesdropping strategy -to send the same quantum states in the case of the conclusive result and to send no state in the case of inconclusive result -applies to the four states one, it is important to prove that the unambiguous quantum measurement is not possible in this case: if not, we should check the rate of absorbed signals in the four state one, too. We prove it in the following. First, we consider an experimental setup of the Einstein-PodolskyRosen ( EPR ) [14, 15] , where we intend the superluminal communication: let the state of source particle pairs is the singlet one
) , where u and u ′ denote two arbitrary different directions and the subscript 1 and 2 denote the two sites which may be space-likely separated each other. If the one at site 1 performs spin-measurement along u (u ′ ) directionŜ u (Ŝ u ′ ), the state of particles given at site 2 is the mixture of |u+ and |u− ( |u ′ + and |u ′ − ) with equal probability. Thus if the one at site 2 can distinguish between them, the one at site 1 can send signal instantaneously to the one at site 2, by performingŜ u orŜ u ′ , according to the 2-bit sequence he wants to send. Of course, this is not possible because the density operators corresponding to the two mixtures is an identical one
prove the impossibility of the unambiguous measurement in this case. Suppose that there is an unambiguous measurement with which we can know one of the four states, say |u+ , with certainty, and with an efficiency η ( η < 1 ). The one at site 1 performsŜ
and N is an integer ) when the signal bit is 0 ( 1 ). The one at site 2 performs the unambiguous measurement N times which distinguish |u+ . Then, when the one at site 1 4 performsŜ u (Ŝ u ′ ), the state given at site 2 is mixture of |u+ and |u− ( |u ′ + and |u ′ − ) with equal probability, and thus, the unambiguous measurement give the outcome that |u+ is detected with certainty with the probability p = Nη > 1 ( that |u+ is not detected with certainty, at all ). Thus the one at site 2 can distinguish the two mixtures and can implement the superluminal communication. It follows that the unambiguous measurement is not possible in this case from the impossibility of the superluminal communication.
Above we have shown that in the four states one the eavesdropping strategy considered above does not come into being, since there is no unambiguous measurement in the four states one. And many recent proposals and elaborations of quantum cryptographic implementations are based on the four states one. Thus, it may be said that we need not be concerned about such an eavesdropping. However, considering some possible applications of the two states one such as the recently proposed one by B. Huttner et al. [13] where the two states one and the four states one are combined to obtain a safer one than the two previous ones, the above strategy should be considered.
In summary, we discussed the unambiguous measurement of quantum nonorthogonal states in connection with the quantum cryptography. We showed that checking a ratio of null one to signal is essential in detecting a certain kind of eavesdropping in the case of two nonorthogonal states quantum cryptography. We proved that it is not needed in the case of the four states quantum cryptography.
